


Singular Apparatus,
Differentiated Terrains



LINES IN THE SAND

Writings on the Gaza Solidarity Encampment
& Campus Flood at U.C. Berkeley from
an Anarchist Prisoner of War

Casey Goonan

*transcribed, formatted, & edited
with love & rage from
comrades to the end*

cover images:

شهادة الاطفال في زمن الحرب

In Time of War: Children Testify

(Drawings by Palestinian Children)

Beirut: Mawakif / PFLP, 1970

April 17, 2026

Palestinian Prisoners' Day

with whatever weapons at hand

withwhateverweapons.noblogs.org



Editor's Note

The content of this book comprises writings and letters written by Casey during their time at Santa Rita Jail in the year before they were sentenced to federal prison. Some of the ideas and opinions expressed in this text are rooted in a particular moment in time and do not reflect Casey's current views on strategy, approach, and political action. These are not definitive statements and must not be construed as such, especially given that Casey is imprisoned and certain ideas may create undesirable repercussions. The editors have aimed to be as faithful as possible to Casey's original words in the transcription and editing process, with minor spelling and grammar changes for readability.

Singular Apparatus, Differentiated Terrains

[An apparatus] is, first and foremost, a thoroughly heterogeneous set consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as much as the unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the network that can be established between these elements...

...by the term “apparatus” I mean a kind of formation, so to speak, that at a given historical moment, has as its major function the response to an urgency. The apparatus therefore has a dominant strategic function...

...I said that the nature of an apparatus is essentially strategic, which means that we are speaking about a certain manipulation of relations of forces, of a relational and concrete intervention in the relations of forces, either so as to develop them in a particular direction, or to block them, to stabilize them, and to utilize them. The apparatus is thus always inscribed into a play of power, but it is also always linked to certain limits of knowledge that arise from it and, to an equal degree, condition it. The apparatus is precisely this: a set of strategies of the relations of force supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge.

—*Michel Foucault*¹

I

The zionist colonial entity “Israel” is not merely an ally of U.S. settler empire but its social-historical extension and military-political appendage, inseparable parts of a singular apparatus of land occupation, population displacement, and warfare. The assumed autonomy of the zionist entity from U.S. geopolitical interests is largely superficial, always overdetermined in the final instance by the dictates and imperatives of Amerikkkan statecraft and national-economic needs. This remains the case even in the current conjuncture, as the U.S. government hides its hand and acts as if it has no control over Israel’s war of extermination in Gaza and the West Bank. Surely a move toward innocence, this performative incapacity and concealment of decisive agency in shaping Israeli military policy is no more than a fabrication—the posture play of “good cop, bad cop.”

The United States government is the predominating funder of the zionist entity’s nation-building and war-waging capacities, and will remain so because its fledgling military-political hegemony in the region is dependent on Israel as its proxy command and forward base. This is despite the fact that U.S. settler empire maintains bases scattered across every continent. As Faisal Al-Asad succinctly writes, Israel today is “the purest expression of militarized settler colonialism acting as a lynchpin of Western imperialism and fossil capitalism as a whole,” a “key and integral component of the cycle of capital accumulation in the region.”² The United States of Amerikkka

and Israeli-zionist entity are thus symbiotic and mutually-constitutive, hence my conceptualization of both forming a *singular apparatus*. The former can no longer maintain its dominance without the latter, while the latter may not be capable of operating at all in the form of a settler colonial nation-state without the extensive financial support and relentless military backing by the former.

U.S.A.-Israeli civilizational co-dependence will become increasingly apparent (and desperate) over the next several years if the revolutionary anti-colonial insurgency of the Palestinian resistance and global solidarity movement continue to persist in the face of ongoing, gratuitous and massively fatal settler terror-reaction.³ Such symbioses also explain why the reaction to Operation Al-Aqsa Flood from settler colonizers on both sides of the Atlantic has been (and continues to be) so intense. This mutually-constituting arrangement of “national” interests, state power, and colonial-bourgeois social formation comprises a shared geography and continuous landscape of interrelated reactions, which in turn melts away any strict distinction between either territorial occupation, their carceral-policing and military edifices, and their peculiar structures of social/racial antagonism. This is why participation in the revolutionary anticolonial insurgency initiated by the Al-Aqsa Flood is so important from within the core of U.S. settler empire.

To risk explaining the obvious, if both settler nations bind together to form a singular apparatus of occupation, displacement, and warfare, then it can also be said that we inhabit the *same terrain of struggle* as the resistance in Gaza

and the West Bank, just a different theater, with its own particular circumstances to account for. How we conceptualize the geographic dimensions of both U.S.-Israeli state power/violence and anticolonial insurgency has a direct impact on the form and content of our solidarity movement outside of historic Palestine—from the kind of tactics deemed appropriate or necessary in the play of strategic thinking, to the formation of collective political imaginations that either constrains or helps make possible the advancement of revolutionary struggle.⁴

The revolution in Palestine has been long, dating at least to the 1936-39 period chronicled by Ghassan Kanafani, himself a PFLP member before his 1972 assassination. The transgenerational struggle has included bombings of railways and pipelines, airline hijackings, airport attacks—among other things, the kinds of actions that would help provide the world with the modern meaning of the term “terrorist,” consolidated by press and politicians in their transvaluation of militant resistance in the seventies. Anticolonial warfare is by definition asymmetrical struggle over territory; terrorism is simply what the imperial side calls the requisite tactics of their antagonists. In this case, form aligns with content, tactics with goals. This history provides a useful reflection on October’s Toufan al-Aqsa on October 7, 2023—which was, among other things, a study in asymmetric brilliance. Anticolonial struggle looks like this because it is anticolonial struggle, not (despite Zionist solecisms) because of the moral characters of Hamas or Jihad or the PFLP or DFLP, all participants in that battle within a long war. The same history offers a different reflection, at a quite distinct political level and considerable geographical distance, on the student intifada, whose commitment is inarguably the liberation of Palestine but whose immediate demand is, in main, that the schools divest from firms and funds providing support to the Zionist entity.

*—Research and Destroy*⁵

II

What precisely is Operation Al-Aqsa Flood? What historical processes were set in motion by the insurgent actions of the Palestinian resistance on October 7, 2023? What in fact are its objectives? Its key strategic features? What are the global implications of the Flood?

To my knowledge, the Al-Aqsa Flood can be conceptualized in terms of three or four distinct yet connected levels of analysis. On a basic descriptive level, the Flood is a “meticulously executed guerrilla operation” organized among a united front coalition of resistance factions, combined with a popular insurrectionary component.⁶ In its immediate strategic and operational objectives, the Flood is a major military offensive designed to smash the Gaza Command, the Zionist entity’s southern base which controls the border, wall, and envelope dividing Gazans from the “67 territory,” the main geographic body of Israeli occupation. Relatedly, the Flood was a mission to acquire resources that would maximize bargaining power and leverage in eventual negotiations with the enemy over several proposed demands: chief among them is the mass release of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli prisons and detention, along with the fate of Palestinian access to Al Aqsa/Al Quds-Jerusalem. This took the form of over 200 hostages captured by resistance factions, many of them soldiers, all of them settlers in the illegal and continuously expanding settlements that occupy the territory just beyond the envelope.

While the absolute disregard for the lives of its own

citizens held hostage and the bloodlust campaign of extermination by Israel were impossible to predict on this scale of magnitude, some calculated and anticipated outcomes that did materialize as a result of the Flood are: the deepening of crises internal to the Israeli national form, the demoralization of the Zionist policing and military regime from prolonged hostilities spread across multiple simultaneous fronts, and the further delegitimization of the Palestinian Authority (PA) neocolonial puppet government.

Rather than a single action, it is more useful to think about the Flood as a series of initiatives unfolding across a wide geography in multiple locations. As mentioned, there is first the initial attack on the envelope, which is then followed by a second wave of Gazans incurring across the border, or, the popular-insurrectional component. This unfolds as a simultaneous formal-organized attempt to storm into occupied territory and informal spontaneous uprising that seizes upon the space torn open by the catalyst-incursions. Operationally speaking, the opening acts of the Flood began with a *diversion*, as Hamas fires missiles upon the coast of the '67 territory, stretching up as north as Tel Aviv. Coinciding with this diversion, resistance forces engage in *interference* by systematically destroying Israeli video-surveillance technology along the border. These opening maneuvers are followed by the spearhead-demolition and storming of the border fencing at several strategic points. The formal, coordinated bloc of the resistance factions appears to primarily target military sites for expropriation and the acquisition of assets (including hostages).

The explosive popular insurrectionary bloc that trailed did not flow from or toward any preplanned objective and varied in its content and forms of action.

Another dimension to the Al-Aqsa Flood is the intentionality behind the operation as a *catalyst for longer-term objectives*, and with this, initiating a larger, protracted global-scaled war for Palestinian national liberation—to be distinguished from the Zionist entity's war of extermination and accelerated racial genocide. This protracted anticolonial perspective fixes attention to the Palestinian liberation army's initiative as the means by which international resistance can overturn the material equation of force that the Israeli settler nation is predicated on. As Bikrum Gill argues, this equation of force is embodied in a double economy of force, with colonialism and imperialism based on a foundational greater violence, accompanied by a secondary ideological projection of “invincibility” and “rationality” that has been normalized over time by colonial society.⁷ The *anticolonial* equation of force asserted by the Al-Aqsa Flood correspond with and reflects an understanding of this reality (of “greater violence”), actualizing a concrete basis for Palestinian sovereign power that can enforce the right of return, the reclamation of stolen lands, an end to the blockade of Gaza, and an end to the relentless incarceration and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians in the West Bank. In Gill's words:

[In] so far as Al Aqsa Flood expressed the logic of a rising war of national liberation, that was overturning the

underlying equation of force, such recognition would amount to a fatal loss of belief in the viability of israel as a settler-colonial project. It is this contradiction that makes the Al-Aqsa Flood operation unintelligible to israel and the West except as an act of pure irrational savagery that can thus only be responded to with the logic of total elimination.⁸

The Palestinian resistance has, rather than appeal for its “humanity” to be recognized by the zionist entity or Western imperialism, instead pursued a war of social truth on the battlefield, in their own streets, in defense of Gaza. With Israel unable to defeat the resistance on the ground, the Palestinians have “commanded recognition of their political rationality” and “brought the racialized framework of ‘irrational savagery’ to a crisis point.”

The ongoing protracted defense of Gaza and the West Bank by a unified front of Palestinian resistance factions (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, Lion’s Den, etc.) within a wider regional “axis of resistance” is organized together through a framework known as *unity of fields*. The shift to defense and counter-offensive guerrilla maneuvers following the initial attack on the envelope is a calculated aspect of the strategy guiding Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. In November 2023, scholar Toufic Haddad astutely notes how an international situation will be

emerging on multiple fronts where a war of attrition of different orders arises in Gaza, on the Northern border with Lebanon, in Yemen, and possibly even Jordan, with [specific]

dynamics individually and collectively frustrating Israel, while creating arenas in which this “Israel problem” begins to shake up Western capitalist alliances, as well as possibly their capitals... due to strengthening mobilizations for Palestine from Western citizens and movements.... October 7 [2023] has opened up so many questions and opportunities to expose, talk about, and organize a whole new Palestinian movement, which can and should play a role in building new left movements. The politics, determinations, and organizing that it is required to stop the Israeli war machine entails a much more radical set of politics, tactics, and strategies than those which have been attempted up to now.⁹

The spirit of the defense of Gaza vectors outward in its transgressive effects, as the panic-reaction and terror-backlash from colonizers and the urgency-imperative of Palestinian resistance and survival serves to intensify the cohesion and solidarity among axis blocs, while galvanizing a global solidarity movement of unprecedented scale. The global solidarity movement, in its own turn, can be further theoretically categorized into two different tendencies with as much overlaps as divergences. This distinction can schematically be broken down into, on the one hand, a mass-based *popular protest tendency*, with a predominately pacifist orientation to political struggle. On the other hand, a much smaller yet militant *proto-insurrectional* tendency has emerged, using more combative methods and taking form through decentralized and autonomous attacks, primarily against weapons contractors, state property, and infrastructure.

Decentralized, horizontal, and widespread, the unity of fields approach to protracted, international revolutionary-anticolonial struggle relies on a model of communication that “leverages the instant exchange of information available” and converts “facts on the ground” into signals between axis groups who work together toward common objectives “without being placed under the same structure of governance.”¹⁰ As Abaljawad Omar eloquently describes it: “unified in vision yet localized in execution.”¹¹ The unity of fields framework has been an important factor for the Palestinian resistance factions (internally) and other axis groups (Hezbollah, Ansar Allah, etc.) to preserve freedom of action and initiative, by imparting a flexibility to the structure of relationships. The arrangement enables each to act quickly and improvise as needed to create “multiple dilemmas for Israel across different theaters of operation,” allowing the resistance to sustain pressure from numerous directions, autonomously, and still maintain insurgent cohesion. So long as realities do not diverge too significantly from the collective narrative, creating constraints and contextual limits on the possibility for axis groups to engage fluidly and decisively in shared struggle, the framework is effective.

An undertheorized dimension of the unity of fields framework remains the relationship between the resistance axis and the global solidarity movement. It is here, at the question of the relation between the solidarity movement outside of the region and axis groups (including factions on the ground defending Gaza and the West Bank), where it is necessary to bring into view the final level of analyzing Operation Al-Aqsa

Flood. This final level of analysis is a recognition of the Flood as a *paradigm for contemporary decolonization and abolition praxis* in the United States, toward the propagation of social war in the belly of settler empire.

The question of Palestine 'solidarity' itself now meets a belated reckoning, its erstwhile self-evidence cracking under the historical force of Al-Aqsa Flood, and its fault lines revealing new depths and divergences. This is precisely as it should be: the Palestinian resistance has sought nothing less than to "crack history open" and divulge the latent possibilities seemingly foreclosed by the hegemony of empire.

In the region itself, "normalization" named the total victory of fossil capitalism and systemic destruction. October 7th derailed this consensus and charted a different course, one which has recentered Palestine as the fulcrum of class struggle and moreover insists in its final determinacy through what can only be described as a people's war. The importance of the latter as a political project and strategic horizon cannot be over-stated, and its meaning has yet to become clear for Western solidarity movements. While it is unlikely that the resistance leadership fully anticipated the abyssal depths to which Israel would sink in exacting bloody retribution, the destructive and vindictive nature of the response was well within its expectations.

The Flood was nevertheless unleashed as an opening salvo of a war, the outcomes, stakes, and risks of which would implicate the masses of Palestine and the Arab world as a whole. The objectively incalculable cost incurred as a result is not the price of a negotiated ceasefire or a phased

return to normalization, but that of a concrete and calculated set of objectives which would give the resistance an advanced position and a firmer footing in its anticipated popular war. These include but are not limited to the maximal number of Palestinian captives, the delegitimization of the Vichy government of the Palestinian Authority, the undermining and demoralization of israel's military and security apparatuses, and the deepening of its internal political crisis. These are the intended advances in a war of maneuver for which the resistance had been painstakingly preparing and capacity-building for years.

Across the West Bank and wider region, the Flood continues to rally the masses and popular armed movements, crystalizing political alignments and opening up new fronts of resistance. Beyond the region, however, such lines have yet to be drawn, and Palestine solidarity remains imprisoned in the form of it acquired through its interminable war of position. If it is to have any meaningful role in the political terrain opened by the Flood, the solidarity movement must re-examine both its form and content in line with the people's war, including its current objectives as well as its longterm ambitions.

In concrete terms, this will of course depend on a practical evaluation of the movement's situation and conditions in any one locale.

*—Faisal Al-Assad*¹²

We all share the inspiring images coming from [Columbia University and Cal Poly Humboldt]—but who will commit to studying and adapting those lessons to fit [their own] conditions?

*—Within Our Lifetime*¹³

III

Taking Operation Al-Aqsa Flood seriously as a *paradigm* of decolonization and abolition praxis in the U.S. context requires a radically different geographic imaginary and sense of place than what characterizes the normative spatial common-sense of the Palestine solidarity movement. In relationship to the resistance operating in historical Palestine, i believe we must conceptualize all fronts where the axis groups and global solidarity movement are active as inhabiting a shared terrain and continuous surface, made up of different “theaters” or “fields,” yet nonetheless struggling within the same overarching structure of antagonisms—against the same apparatus of U.S.-Israeli coalescence through land occupation, population displacement, and warfare.

The intifada on the university campuses in the spring of 2024 (which is ongoing, yet in contained, repressed, and mutated forms) serves as but one expression among many articulations of the global solidarity movement which took shape in ways specific to its context of emergence and the class character/positionally/aspirations of its various participants.

Taking Operation Al-Aqsa Flood seriously as a paradigm for decolonization and abolition praxis in the U.S. context requires us to collapse the presumed spatial separation and assumptive methodological alterity between the various anticolonial formations (i.e. the axis of resistance and global solidarity movement) and their respective domains of struggle. The task of revolutionary theory here is to demystify (and thus

shrink) the fabricated distance between the various sites/scenes of a global struggle so that we understand the continuum of power/violence that forms our shared terrains, while deprovincializing the political geography of Western/settler nations as (potential) zones of guerrilla combat rather than havens of colonial entitlement and impunity only. To allow the normalization of performative activism and protest theater-as-“solidarity” to go on any longer is to commit to a form of politics known as *false internationalism*: the practice of claiming one’s praxis is against U.S.-Israeli settler empire while remaining non-antagonistic to and/or assimilated by its political engine of white civil society.

Taking Operation Al-Aqsa Flood seriously as a paradigm for decolonization and abolition praxis in the U.S. context also requires the production of a stronger sense of insurgent cohesion and synchronicity between the militant wing of the global solidarity movement and the initiatives of the axis of resistance, as a step further to deprovincialize the settler domain of the U.S. “homeland” or geography where the guerrilla proposition is made to feel impossible and inappropriate. Leaning into the tension created by a pedagogical and practical embrace of this revolutionary paradigm will generate a resolution to the problem of the Western solidarity movement’s programmatic pacifism. Our task from this point forward is to wage a relentless ideological struggle against the colonality of acceptable tactics.

Drawing similar conclusions from a different coast, comrades from Lenapehoking territory propose a starting

point:

The movement in the U.S. is at a major crossroad—where we are seeing a split between those committed to revolutionary change and those who are invested, consciously or unconsciously, in the continuation of U.S. empire...

The movement in the U.S. is currently scattered and, importantly, factions of the movements have remarkably different political goals. To build a capable resistance, we must flesh out these objectives to able to coordinate from collective to collective, faction to faction. It is essential that any unity is defined by that process. So long as a shared horizon can be envisioned, we believe unity is possible.

We propose these objectives as an essential starting place:

1. The end of the zionist regime, a free autonomous Palestine, and solidarity with the Palestinian resistance.
2. The revolutionary end of the settler-colonialist regime of the United States.
3. Coordinating our efforts faction to faction to undermine the U.S. regime and their political-military proxies internationally to weaken the entire colonial system.

In establishing this base level of shared agreement the movement can then strive towards middle and longer term plans and end the confounding cycle of reactiveness that has plagued us for so long. To be clear, we are calling for a reformation of the movement away from symbolism and

spectacle, so when calls are made to intensify the struggle, or when the exploited rise, we are not trapped in the activist fog that the movement itself has created. If we truly want freedom for Palestine this should be the first step. Indigenous and Black liberation and all internationalist revolutionary movements have always known this truth: the freedom of Palestinians which is intrinsically tied to all colonized people, will take nothing short of the dissolution of the U.S. empire, and our efforts must dignify the rebels in Gaza and the West Bank.¹⁴

Notes

1. Michel Foucault, *Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 194-96.

2. Faisal Al-Assad, "Reflections on the 'Global Student Intifada,'" *Ebb Magazine* (January 11, 2025), <https://www.ebb-magazine.com/essays/reflections-on-the-global-student-intifada>.

3. The United States military's *Joint Publication 3-24: Counterinsurgency* defines "insurgency" as: "The organized use of subversion and violence to seize, nullify, or challenge political control of a region." Quoted in Martin Schoots-McAlpino, "Anatomy of a Counter-Insurgency," *Monthly Review Online* (blog post, July 3, 2020), <https://mronline.org/2020/07/03/anatomy-of-a-counter-insurgency/>.

4. In using the term "strategic thinking," i am working from a definition of "strategy" as a specific plan to achieve a set of goals in the existing overall situations. Relatedly, by "tactics" i am referring to the means by which operations are carried out. Strategic analysis determines what operations should be carried out, and in what framework. As T. Derbent describes, within revolutionary warfare, such analysis entails several components worth mentioning: 1) calculation of the risks involved, anticipating how, as the revolution progresses, there will be a qualitative escalation on the part of counter-revolution to be expected and planned for; 2) keeping operations in line with the politico-military goal and not reacting on the basis of "ego" or "prestige;" 3) always having prepared a fallback position; 4) resolution once the action is initiated; 5) being flexible about what methods/resources to use when faced with unforeseen developments (15). General principals of revolutionary strategy include: the primacy

of the political over military; primacy of people over things; primacy of interior over exterior; concern with its connection to the popular masses; regardless of the main form of struggle adopted, no form of struggle is neglected: mass struggle, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, legal struggles, psychological warfare, covert warfare, terrorism, and insurrectionary movements; the goal is the total destruction of the enemy's armed forces. An important takeaway from Derbent's pamphlet is that as soon as our analysis abandons its material basis as a concrete analysis of a concrete situation, connected to a political practice, then it becomes abstract theory.

4. T. Derbent, *Categories of Revolutionary Military Policy* (Montreal: *Kersplebedeb*, 2006).

5. Research and Destroy, "The Student Intifada," *Verso Books* (blog post, June 21, 2024), <https://www.versobooks.com/en/blogs/news/the-student-intifada>

6. Calli Adi, "The Great Gaza Ghetto Uprising," Field Notes (*Brooklyn Rail*, May 2024), <https://brooklynrail.org/2024/05/field-notes/The-Gaza-Ghetto-Uprising/>.

7. Bikrum Gill, "Two Logics of War: Liberation Against Genocide," *Ebb Magazine* (April 3, 2024), <https://www.ebb-magazine.com/essays/two-logics-of-war>.

8. Ibid.

9. Toufic Haddad, "Palestinian Resistance and the War in Gaza," interview, *New Politics*, Vol. 19 No. 4 (2024), https://newpol.org/issue_post/palestinian-resistance-and-the-war-in-gaza/.

10. "On Campus Action and the Unity of the Fields," *Resistance News Network* (Telegram post, April 29, 2024), archived at Abolition Media, <https://abolitionmedia.noblogs.org/7682/>.

11. Abdaljawad Omar, "Ceasefire in Lebanon, and the future of resistance to Israel," *Mondoweiss* (November 27, 2024), <https://mondoweiss.net/2024/11/ceasefire-in-lebanon-and-the-future-of->

resistance-to-israel/.

12. Faisal Al-Assad, “Reflections on the ‘Global Student Intifada” (2024).

13. Within Our Lifetime, “To Them, We Are All Outside Agitators: Encampments & Escalation” (2024), <https://wolpalestine.com/en/campments/>.

14. “The Last Intifada,” *Tinderbox: A Journal of Combative Anarchy* (2024). In line with this, the Revolutionary Intercommunalism Research Group writes:

Without enduring and flexible grassroots organizations, cultural movements, collective affinity groups, organizing hubs, social centers, or bookstores, mass struggles will continue to rely on [place-based resistance and improvised static bases of resistance like camps and occupations]. Those who hope to move the paradigm of strategic defense to strategic offense will have to develop 21st century organizational proposals that allow large numbers of angry people to coordinate resources without having to build an ad hoc “headquarters” amidst the front lines.

Cited in The Revolutionary Intercommunalism Research Group, “The Student Intifada and the Revolution to Come,” *Radar Journal*, no. 1 (2024), <https://radarjournal.online/pdfs/issue1.pdf>.

LINES IN THE SAND

Writings on the Gaza Solidarity Encampment
& Campus Flood at U.C. Berkeley from
an Anarchist Prisoner of War

1. To Speak for Myself
2. Poetry
3. Academicism, within & without the Academy
4. Singular Apparatus, Differentiated Terrains
5. University of California as Infrastructure of Empire
6. Light the Way, Part I: The Gaza Solidarity
Encampment at U.C. Berkeley
7. Site & Scene of the University Campus
8. Forms of Struggle
9. Light the Way, Part II: The Campus Flood
10. Lines in the Sand
11. Federal Task-Force to Combat Anti-[Zionism]
12. A Message to a Prisoner Letter Writing Event
13. Timeline of the Gaza Solidarity Encampment Wave
& Campus Flood at U.C. Berkeley



Casey Goonan is a dedicated community educator, writer, distroist, printer, and anarchist/anti-imperialist political prisoner who has committed their life to struggles for liberation. Casey is incarcerated for actions carried out in solidarity with Palestinians facing genocide in Gaza and in response to the repressive actions against the pro-Palestine student encampments in the United States. In January 2025, Casey pleaded guilty to one count of maliciously damaging or destroying property used in or affecting interstate commerce by means of fire or an explosive for the arson attack on a campus police car. As part of a plea agreement, Casey took responsibility for other attacks but pleaded not guilty to the additional charges and was sentenced to 235 months in federal prison. Just as Casey has persistently for years cared for, supported, and struggled alongside incarcerated comrades, we aim to replicate these actions in solidarity with Casey as they continue their struggle from the other side of the wall. A note from Casey in September 2025: *“Thanks to everybody out there who has shown me love and offered support through this time. I wish every prisoner could experience the level of support you all have shown to me. In here, I’ve done my best to show my love to all my fellow prisoners and I remain steadfast to the movement to Palestinian liberation and the movements for decolonization and abolition worldwide.”* More information:

freecaseynow.noblogs.org

Writing a letter to a political prisoner or prisoner of war is a concrete way to support those imprisoned for their political struggles. A letter is a simple way to brighten someone's day in prison by creating human interaction and communication—something prisons attempt to destroy. Beyond that, writing keeps prisoners connected to the communities and movements of which they are a part, allowing them to provide insights and stay up to date. Writing to prisoners is not charity, as we on the outside have as much to gain from these relationships as the prisoners. Knowing the importance of letter writing is crucial. Prisons are very lonely, isolating, and disconnected places. Any sort of bridge from the outside world is greatly appreciated. Find out more:

nycabc.wordpress.com



with whatever weapons at hand